Discours en conflit et conflit en discours. Contextes institutionnels
taken from a verse in the Qur'an, in which the prophet of Islam invited the people of the scriptures (Jews and Christians) to unite in the worship of God. This second letter was not addressed to the Pope exclusively, but to all Christian leaders all over the world; it took the form of an invitation to an open and rational dialogue between the two religions. The text triggered many reactions, some hostile and others warm and congenial. A case in point for the latter is the Yale Center for Faith and Culture's "A Common Word", Christian Response.
2
I will explore the communicative rationality the writers A Common Word between Us and You (henceforward ACW) and "A Common Word" Christian Response (henceforward CR) , resort to in order to bridge the gap between Muslims and Christians, eradicate conflict and disagreement between them. I will first show that far from being transparent and unproblematic, "conflict" is a highly vexed term that has always triggered deep political and philosophical debates and disagreements. I will then analyze the expressions consensus and agreement from a rhetorical perspective, with the help of notions such as audience, ethos, kairos, identification, presence. Finally, I will show that despite the insistence on consensus and agreement, dissensus and disagreement slightly persist in this epistolary exchange.
Conflict, consensus, dissensus 3
The word conflict is a hypernym that may refer, according to Roget's Thesaurus, to a struggle, clash, battle, contention, strife, opposition, collision, disagreement, row, quarrel, controversy, etc . It has a highly negative connotation and it subsumes different forms of active opposition between at least two parties. For this reason, conflict is considered as a symptom or manifestation of a failure of some sorts; ideally, it is to be avoided and its positive counterparts, agreement and consensus, should prevail at the end of each human interaction, be it personal or collective (Amossy, 2014) .
4
This dismissive attitude towards conflict has predominated in the field of social sciences and political philosophy for decades. For Jürgen Habermas, conflict should only characterize the beginning of a public dialogue and it should be resolved by consensus, which is the telos and the ideal regulator of human interactions. From the perspective of deliberative democracy, of which Jürgen Habermas is one of the most prominent representatives, authentic public dialogue is a process that aims at producing a valid and justified consensus. It is established by a process of mutual agreement upon significant values and symbols and it is built on communicative rationality, which is characterized by:
… the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld." (Habermas, 1984: 10) 5 Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics establishes a strong link between consensus, reciprocity, justification and reason giving (1986: 141 ; 1992: 99) ; the communicative rationality he promotes provides discussants with a procedure for ascertaining the intersubjective validity of a claim and the formation of a common will in public dialogue. In Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics, the validity of moral and political norms can only be established by an intersubjective and idealized practice of argumentation (1992: 22) . For, indeed, once engaged in a public dialogue, discussants tacitly commit themselves to justifying their claims and supporting them by rational arguments and claims which have to be intersubjectively valid and mutually accepted. As a consequence, the claims issued by each discussant call for a discursive and pragmatic analysis so as to bring to the fore the logics of argumentation at work and the normative presuppositions that inform the public dialogue.
6
Jürgen Habermas's perspective is premised on the power of persuasion between rational partners engaged in a rational and tempered exchange; each using different rhetorical strategies and each having a drive for consensus. Obviously enough, he is far from naïve and he is aware that this is but an ideal-typical situation for, in reality, human interactions and public dialogues are, more often than not, characterized by a persistent mutual misunderstanding, deep and incommensurable disagreements. In fact, conflict is not always conceived of negatively; it has also been theorized, by many thinkers, such as John Rawls (1996) , Christian Kock (2007) , Jacques Rancière (1995 ; 2009 ), Chantal Mouffe (1999 , to mention but a few, as a highly positive philosophical and rhetorical category which sheds light on how certain issues are tackled in a society. The different modalities and expressions of conflict in the public sphere and the ways they are handled are indicative of the solidity of the democracy or of its weakness. Consequently, consensus should not be viewed as the only legitimate and acceptable endpoint of a debate or conflict situation; in some cases, it may even be indicative of the absence of a genuine pluralism. For these thinkers, pluralism and divergences in opinions in stances towards political, social or societal issues are the sine qua non condition for a genuine democracy. Therefore, instead of standing for communicative failure or a dialogue of the deaf (Angenot, 2008) , conflict may also be a symbol of a dynamic, pluralistic democracy.
7
In John Rawls's theory of liberal and democratic pluralism (1996) , disagreement, as a discursive expression of conflict, is not due to irrationality, prejudice, or self-interest; it may be due to the very nature of a truly open society. The latter is a society where enduring and fathomless disagreements over a wide range of moral, ethical, and other philosophical matters are acceptable. Actually, conflicts and unresolved disagreements do persist even after a long discussion regulated by all the precepts of rationality, moderation and reasonableness. What prevails in such cases is what John Rawls calls "reasonable disagreement" and "overlapping consensus"; these two notions provide us with a way out of the rigid and reductionist binary oppositions between consensus and dissensus, agreement or conflict, etc. To John Rawls, reasonable disagreement on divergent moral, religious and philosophical worldviews is possible and legitimate when there is a shared commitment to a common sense of fairness and mutual confidence (Rawls, 1996: 137) . Indeed, it is only possible and legitimate when disputants comply with the ideal of public reason which involves the existence of a reasonable pluralism concerning religious and personal ethical ideals (Rawls, 1996: 50) .
8
To Jacques Rancière, dissensus is not a quarrel over personal interests or opinions; it is a political process and an instance of litigation (Rancière, 1995 ; 2009) . It creates a fissure in the sensible order by confronting an established framework of perception, thought, and action with what may be held as an 'inadmissible" framework (2009: 187) . Therefore, dissensus is the essence of politics because it makes of democracy the "count of the unaccounted" and it enables the political subject to establish a new scene of enunciation from which silenced, marginalized, dissenting, or opposing voices may speak out. In Jacques Rancière's theory, dissensus is a powerful means for securing a pluralistic public sphere and it is always to be grounded on the deliberative virtues of "reasonableness". Chantal Mouffe (1999) , too, insists on the importance of political conflict, agonism, and disagreement. She dissociates agonism from antagonism by calling for a rehabilitation of the agôn logôn, or the contest of speeches, which stresses the crucial role of persuasion, argumentation, as well as a respect for the opponent who is not seen as the enemy but as an adversary. Mouffe criticizes, from a post-political perspective, the illusion according to which the exchange of reasoned arguments will lead to an inclusive, rational, universal consensus (2016: 55). Besides, Chantal Mouffe's agonistic pluralism seeks to bring to the fore the contradictions of those political or philosophical theories that invoke rationality as a normative regulator of public dialogue and which are, according to her, usually prone to marginalize or exclude dissenting and adversarial voices. To Chantal Mouffe, it is impossible to have consensus without exclusion since consensus explicitly or implicitly rules out the possibility of rational and legitimate dissent (1999: 755) . Since, in her theory, consensus always goes hand in hand with a form of exclusion, be it implicit or stark, it is in the last analysis but one the many disguises of hegemony.
10 Andrew Knops (2012) views the opposition between consensus and agonistic dissensus as artificial to some extent; to him, agonism is not necessarily an obstacle to or antagonistic with deliberation; he maintains that deliberation and agonism are complementary. Therefore, instead of opposing deliberation and the rational search for consensus to Chantal Mouffe's agnostic (1999 Mouffe's agnostic ( : 2016 pluralism, he contends that each perspective stresses different facets of the same project (2007: 125), hence his emphasis on the possibility of integrating "agonism as a theory of the moment of difference within a broader deliberative dialectic" (2012: 153).
12 As we have seen, the aforementioned thinkers and scholars, except of course Jürgen Habermas, do not consider consensus as the ideal endpoint to all debates, on the one hand, and, on the other, they stress the importance of conflict and dissensus in public dialogue. Two premises are of particular importance to the analysis of discursive and rhetorical construction of conflict and consensus in this article. First, it's my contention that any analysis of conflict and disagreement should take into account the distinction between the types of arguments, introduced by Christian Koch. Second, my analysis is premised on the fact that each consensus presupposes the exclusion of a "third". I will show why these two premises account, to a great extent, for the rhetorical choices and strategies resorted to by the signatories of both open letters to handle a thorny issue such as the inter-faith dialogue in a moment of heightened tension. The two open letters and their audiences 13 The two texts analysed belong to the epistolary discourse; in fact, open letters constitute within the epistolary discourse a subgenre with specific discursive features and pragmatic aims. An open letter may be written by a lay citizen or a group of lay citizens as it may be signed by a public figure; each speaks in their own names but also in the name of wider portions of citizens or even in the name of a whole community. Generally, an open letter targets two different audiences; first, it addresses a particular (public) figure who is endowed with an important symbolic capital and who stands metonymically for a wider community, institution, etc.; second, it addresses the general opinion, the whole nation, international community, etc. Besides, it may address a concrete person (Mrs or Mr. So-and-So) or an abstract entity (human conscience, France, America, etc.).
Finally, an open letter aims to form attitudes and induce actions in its audiences since one of its intended perlocutionary effects is to make the addressees aware of a particular situation and to propose the adequate responses to it. An open letter typically seeks to raise collective conscience and have the targeted audiences act collectively to redress a wrong, to actively take part in finding a solution to a public issue (Saki 2013a ; 2013b ; .
14 As we can see, the questions of addressivity and audiences are crucial when dealing with the open letters since the message they convey is shaped to a large extent by the audiences they are addressed to. I will analyze the audiences constructed by the two open letters with the help of Chaïm Perelman's reconceptualization of "audience" which he elevated to almost unprecedented height in rhetorical studies (2008) . According to Perelman, the aims of all argumentation is to win over other people and to create or increase adherence of minds to the theses presented for their assent (2008: 22-25) . To Perelman, argumentation is always audience-oriented and its soundness depends on whether it appeals to the audience or not. To him, "[i]t is indeed the audience which has the major role in determining the quality of argument and the behaviour of orators" (2008: 24); consequently, the techniques used by the arguer must also correspond to the audience's "frame of reference." Finally, Perelman distinguishes between two categories of audience: "particular audiences" and a "universal audience" composed of reasonable and rational people and it is the regulative ideal of maximal intersubjective agreement that appeals values and principles that enjoy unanimous approval (2008: 40-44) .
15 As far as audiences are concerned, the two open letters analysed in this article also target a particular audience and a universal one. The first audience is composed of the direct addressees of each text; i.e. Christian leaders and Muslim scholars, respectively. As we now know, the primary addresses of an open letter always have a metonymic status; therefore, the two open letters under scrutiny in this article go beyond the primary interlocutors and address the religious communities they stand for, that is all Christians and all Muslims:
1. Let us vie with each other only in righteousness and good works. Let us respect each other, be fair, just and kind to another and live in sincere peace, harmony and mutual goodwill. (ACW) 2. "Let this common ground"-the dual common ground of love of God and of neighbour-"be the basis of all future interfaith dialogue between us," your courageous letter urges. Indeed, in the generosity with which the letter is written you embody what you call for. (CR) 17 Besides, these particular audiences, the two letters address a universal audience as well. In fact, the intersubjective relationship established in this epistolary exchange and the choices made to deal with the Christian-Muslim dialogue in a time of growing tension can be fully grasped only by taking into account the address to this universal audience before which both letters expose the ethical soundness of their arguments:
3. As Muslims, we say to Christians that we are not against them and that Islam is not against them-so long as they do not wage war against Muslims on account of their religion, oppress them and drive them out of their homes. (ACW) 4. Since Muslims seek to love their Christian neighbors, they are not against them, the document encouragingly states. Instead, Muslims are with them. As Christians we resonate deeply with this sentiment. (CR)
18 In certain passages of the two texts, the primary addressees are "delocuted" and referred to by "Christians" and "Muslims", and there is a total absence of pronouns such as "you" or "your." Such an absence of "you" and "your" underscores the fact that the inter-faith dialogue is performed in front of a universal audience; an audience to which each group stresses its moral rectitude, its ethical conduct and its commitment to using reason, facts and truths instead of partial and partisan considerations. As we can see, appealing to the universal audience is highly reflexive since the letter signatories show how reasonable, open, and tolerant their religion and the stance they are adopting are, as we will see below.
19 The appeals both to particular audiences and the universal one shed light on the type of intersubjective relationship established in this epistolary exchange; the latter is characterized by a deep commitment to mutual respect and reason. These intersubjective harmony and proximity frame the way the conflict situation is dealt with in these two letters because, as we will see, the writers of the letters constantly reiterate the convergence of their stances and values in order to foster consensus.
Kairos and consensus 20 The epistolary exchange takes place against an immediate background-Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg lecture and the tempestuous controversies it unleashed-and a broader one-the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 2001 and the clash of civilisation trope they reinvigorated. This extra-discursive context shapes to a great extent their contents, the intersubjective relationship they construe with their audiences, the ethos that stands out from each of them as well as the ways in which conflict, consensus, and dissensus are dealt with.
21 The writers of both open letters agree on identifying a similar kairos, that is the right moment and the right to speak; they have the same sense of appropriateness and timeliness, which, in turn, plays a crucial role in the rhetorical choices made in the two texts. To show their awareness of the particular kairos, the signatories repeatedly stress that their texts are issued at the right time and that they represent the right measure to calm down the ever expanding wrangling about Pope Benedict XVI's lecture: The writers of the open letters concur on the fact that their dialogue is brought about by particular historical circumstances and that it is important, in such critical moments, to engage in dispassionate exchange between reasonable people. The language used to describe the kairos of this epistolary exchange is highly evocative and extremely infused with strong affect (terrible weaponry, peaceful relations, survival of the world, critical character, etc.). It describes a present situation laden with threats and tension and vibrant with future orientations, which range from conflict and tension to peace and collaboration.
23 These lexical choices reveal that both parties have a converging perception of the dramatic situation and of the necessity to act and to prompt in each other inclinations towards open cooperation in, what the signatories depict as, dire times. By choosing the right kairos to engage with each other in mutual respect, the signatories of both letters indicate that they have the appropriate understanding of an uncertain and potentially explosive present situation. They seize the right and good kairos to intervene and craft the opportune and adequate response. A response that leaves enough space for each party to expose its values and stress the similarities in the ways of appraising the present situation and the solution they will propose. By seizing the good kairos, the signatories also show how aware they are of the necessity to be tactful and of the importance of engaging in an open dialogue between rational and good willing believers.
24 In sum, kairos and the sense of urgency stress the signatories' awareness of the necessity to act now in order to avoid the worsening of the situation or the deepening of the divide that might separate the two religions. It is this awareness of the particularity of the kairos of their exchange that makes the exchange a window of opportunity that may enable moderate and rational people from both religions to address each other and set an example for others to follow.
Identification and presencing
25 Another important rhetorical strategy deployed by the two open letters to foster consensus between them is what Kenneth Burke terms identification (1950/69a: 203) . In Burke's rhetoric, identification implies that a common ground is being sought and cooperation is being induced or increased between discussants. Spotting the identification processes in the two letters will help us bring to the fore their writers' endeavour to construct a consensual, harmonious inter-faith discursive community. These identification processes are further reinforced by the rhetorical process of presencing; Perelman maintains that "the very fact of selecting certain elements and presenting them to the audience, their importance and pertinency to the discussion are implied. Indeed, such a choice endows these elements with a presence, which is an essential factor in argumentation and one that is far much neglected in rationalistic conceptions of reasoning" (Perelman & Obrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 116) . Therefore, choosing certain elements and making them salient are of paramount importance in argumentation and of great pertinence to how discussants construe their frame of references.
26 The signatories of the two texts ideally identify with each by using an "assumed we" i.e. a community of monotheist believers who transcend religious affiliations and delineations and who are fused into a Christian-Muslim "we":
8. … as Muslims, and in obedience to the Holy Qur'an, we ask Christians to come together to come with us on the common essentials of two our religions the common essentials of two our religions(ACW) 9. … for our common ground is that on which hangs all the Law and the Prophets (Matthew 22:40). mon ground(ACW) 10. "A Common Word Between Us and You" identifies some core common ground between Christianity and Islam which lies at the heart of our respective faiths (CR) 11. We find deep affinities with our own Christian faith when "A Common Word Between Us and You" insists that love is the pinnacle of our duties toward our neighbors (CR)
27 Identification by an "assumed we" has the advantage of explicitly suggesting uniformity and common purpose. The frequent uses of "we" and "us" and the insistence on what they have in common consolidate a strong unity between members of both religions and stress the commonality of their spiritual values and messages. "We, us, our" bridge the initial gap that existed between "You" and "Us" and coalesce the two parties in what is presented as an ideal harmonious and undifferentiated community of believers. The signatories of the two open letters carve out the "assumed we" by giving salience to foundational values that embody the community of their aims: "the common essentials of two our religions ;" "our common ground ;" "core common ground between Christianity and Islam ;" "We find deep affinities with our own Christian faith."
28 By emphasizing this "assumed we," the two parties make the most of one of the basic characteristics of any epistolary exchange: the centrality of the "We-You" relationship. The latter implies a reciprocity whereby the original "you" is not silenced and subordinated out of existence, but is invited to become the "We." Indeed, the predominance of the "assumed we" in the texts analyzed in this article bolsters the intersubjective bond between the two parties and, more importantly, highlights their consubstantiality and their deep affinities. Christians and Muslims are, thus, consubstantial to each other since they share the same substance and they belong to the same spiritual community. Their views and values are not irrevocably antagonistic, but deeply consonant with each other, albeit their being from different faith communities. The "assumed we" celebrated by both texts is the bedrock of their dialogue and, therefore, they can but unite around their common values and promote their mutual inclinations towards consensus, instead of fuelling conflict.
Conflict and the consensual ethos
29 Throughout their texts, the signatories repeatedly indicate that they are not engaged in a dispute or litigation between two hostile parties, with irrevocably irreconcilable positions, telling unvarnished truths to each other. Neither open letter passes negative value judgments on the other party's stances and beliefs because their ultimate and overriding aim is to eradicate conflict and dissensus. In fact, a consensual, moderate ethos (Amossy, 2010) stems from these two letters since the writers of both letters yearn 17. That so much common ground exists-common ground in some of the fundamentals of faith -gives hope that undeniable differences and even the very real external pressures that bear down upon us cannot overshadow the common ground upon which we stand together (CR) 18. To those who nevertheless relish conflict and destruction for their own sake or reckon that ultimately they stand to gain through them, we say that our eternal souls are also at stake if we fail to sincerely make every effort to make peace and come together in harmony (ACW)
34 The "third" in these open letters is referred to in vague and abstract terms: "pressures that bear down upon us," "those who relish conflict and destruction", the writers refuse to engage with it agonistically, to word its claims and arguments and they relegate it to an irrational and dangerous sphere. By so doing, they rule out even the possibility of a rational and legitimate dissensus. Obviously enough, the ominous and unnamed figure of the "third" plays a crucial role in further buttressing the bond between the discussants and, obliquely, enables the signatories to allocate themselves the positive roles of sensible and rational partners.
35 The reference to this vague and threatening "third" reinforces the process of identification thanks to the rhetorical process of dissociation or antithesis. The unnamed, excluded third enables them to come out with an "us-versus-them" polarization and its cognitive structure of thinking in binaries. The dividing line in this symbolic topography doesn't oppose Muslims to Christians, but both Muslims and Christians to a common enemy. This enemy shores up the probity of the discussants' agreement and its supposedly unbiased and reasonable foundation.
36 At times, the letter signatories make reference to important divergences and tensions between Christians and Muslims, but only allusively: The signatories, in their quest of consensus and the eradication of dissensus, invoke divergences between Christians and Muslims, ("deep fissures") and euphemize them at the same time. In 21, the concessive construction starts by admitting the existence of differences between the two religions but relegates these differences to the status of "formal differences" which do not concern their most fundamental creeds: love of God and love of the neighbor.
38 The consensus enacted in this epistolary exchange artificially obliterates the inherently pluralistic dialogicality of such a spiky issue as the inter-faith dialogue. As a matter of fact, the open letters' writers refuse to admit the existence of discordant and dissenting voices and they refuse to accept the agonistic and dissensual dimensions of these voices. In these texts, Muslims and Christians are presented as two monolithic entities with no dividing lines between them or inside each religion. In doing so, they seek to keep at bay the potential disruptive force of the dissenting claims for no real space is left for those who oppose the signatories' stances and the rationale that underlies them.
39 By debarring dissensus, both parties have chosen to strategically divest their dialogue of any possible contradiction and opposition. They preclude voices that contest their consensus and they both unwittingly and authoritatively create an infallible ethos because it is them who, in the last analysis, decide who and what values are excluded and included. Consequently, what is presented as the virtues of a reasonable debate -openness to question, free exchange and mutuality-is also employed as an instrument for silencing and nearly stifling divergent and contestatory points of view.
40 Yet, despite their efforts to obviate genuine dissensus and to minimize their disagreement, some divisive and thorny theological issues still remain as a potentially serious source of contention that may threaten and undermine the harmonious interfaith dialogue the discussants endeavor to stage in their letters. A case in point here is the triune nature of Christ: 43 They seek to alleviate conflict by founding their dialogue on something wider and greater than their own primary communities of belonging, something infinite and profound, however tenuous and fragile it may seem in times of inflamed passions and reactions. They don't seek to gainsay each other, but they constantly acquiesce to what the other party says.
44 Divergence and dissensus are denied, even if they are implicit in the two texts because this epistolary exchange insists on the possibility for Christians and Muslims to overcome separateness, hostility, and conflict. To reach consensus and reject conflict, the signatories establish a harmonious intersubjective relationship and adopt a non-coercive mode of communication where agency is evenly distributed and empathy is possible (Sell, 2007: 3-4) . Indeed, the discussants cultivate a spirit of cooperativeness and stress their agreement on acceptable suitable lines of action in a moment of increasing tension. They rely heavily on the rhetorical mechanism of identification so as to induce cooperation and extol the similarity of their ways of reasoning about the world and about the course of things.
45 These two open letters illustrate the habermassian conception of intersubjective communication and democratic deliberation; the dialogue they stage is arbitrated by a transcendental and universal reason both parties seem to abide by, reason which also enables them to coordinate future actions. Despite the dire situations in which the letters were issued, the writers indicate that the consensus they have reached is not limited in time and contingent; it is presented as a lasting and reasoned one because it is deeply anchored in their own spiritual traditions.
46 But as we have seen, the consensus reached and much stressed in the two open letters is obtained by turning a deaf ear to dissenting voices and by minimizing differences and divergences. The signatories seek, throughout their letters, to exclude, downplay or euphemize any divergence and disagreement. By doing so, they contract the dialogic space of a genuine exchange and transform their dialogue into an almost two-voiced monologue, draining, thus, their epistolary exchange from a genuinely pluralistic and dialogic dimension. Indeed, this dialogue may have gained more genuineness had the signatories acknowledged the existence of real and enduring dissensus over a number of contentious historical or theological issues. This would have shown that a consensus is even stronger when a certain degree of dissensus persists. Afin d'analyser la façon dont la question du conflit a été traitée dans les deux lettres ouvertes, il nous a semblé important de voir comment la notion même de conflit est théorisée et problématisée par des philosophes. Si, pour Jürgen Habermas (1984 ; 1986 ; 1992) , le telos de toute argumentation est le consensus et si le conflit n'est concevable que comme une première phase dans un dialogue public, d'autres philosophes soulignent la fécondité de la notion de conflit et insistent sur l'importance de ne pas le réduire à un échec de la communication. Ainsi, John Rawls (1996) signale qu'il existe des situations où non seulement aucun accord n'est possible mais où le désaccord même est « raisonnable ». Pour Jacques Rancière (1995 ; 2009) , le conflit et le désaccord sont l'essence même du politique car ils permettent d'entendre la voix des « incomptés ». Chantal Mouffe (1999 ; des impératifs catégoriques et éthiques. Toutefois, l'analyse montre également que le consensus célébré par les deux lettres ouvertes est obtenu par l'exclusion d'un tiers dont on n'entend pas la voix et dont la figure demeure à la fois brumeuse et menaçante. Le consensus est également obtenu grâce à la stratégie d'évitement mis en place par les scripteurs qui s'emploient, dans leur lettre, à minimiser ou à neutraliser des divergences fondamentales entre leurs religions. En somme, mon analyse montre que si le dialogue entre deux religions en situation de tension mis en discours dans les deux peut aboutir à un accord grâce au recours à l'éthique de discussion habermassienne, cette même éthique escamote le débat en laissant peu, ou pas, de place à l'expression d'un dissensus raisonnable.
